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In the previous chapter we explained that the aim of our research is to explain 
determinants of success and failure in cross border co-operation in river politics. 
Many authors before us have asked themselves these questions. We have therefore 
made a selection of authors from the broad range of literature on cross border co-
operation that in our view is complementary in giving explanations for the dynamics 
of cross border co-operation. We arrived at our set of publications by searching 
catalogues with key words such as ‘cross-border co-operation’, ‘transboundary 
co-operation’, ‘water politics’, ‘river management’ etc.2 We included literature 
on cross border co-operation in the management of seas, but we dropped water 
dispute resolution literature. These choices demand some explanation.3 The dispute 
resolution literature studies the question of whether water disputes lead to confl ict or 
even war4 and the conditions under which such confl icts are successfully prevented.5 
Our focus is not on confl ict management but on joint policy making by actors from 
two or more neighbouring countries regarding shared (water) problems. Moreover, 
literature on water disputes focuses too much on rivers in developing countries for 
our purposes.6
Although the issue of cross border co-operation in river politics is one that needs 
qualitative understanding, we frequently borrow quantitative concepts such as 
(research) unit, dependent and independent variable. The concept of a ‘unit’ refers 
to the rivers and/or initiatives for cross border co-operation studied. The ‘dependent 
variable’ concept refers to the phenomenon that we would like to explain: cross border 
co-operation, while the ‘independent variable’ refers to the processes and structures 
that explain success and failure in cross border co-operation.
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The ‘independent variable’ in particular is approached differently by the 
researchers whose work we discuss in this chapter. In section 2 we present authors 
who, often implicitly, base their analysis of cross border co-operation on negotiation 
or network approaches to policy making. In section 3 we discuss literature that is 
based on  regime theory and in section 4 we deal with authors who use cognitive, 
discursive and narrative approaches to understand policy making. Finally, in section 5 
we summarise and compare the conclusions of the authors discussed.
2.2 Analyses based on negotiation and network 
theories
Most of the older literature on cross border co-operation in water politics is based 
on an analysis of negotiation processes. The central concepts in these analyses are 
actors, interests and resources. In this view actors try to achieve their objectives 
by negotiating their resources with other actors and by forming ever-changing 
coalitions with these actors. Policy processes are explained by looking at the resulting 
negotiation processes and power relations. All authors discussed here define 
successful co-operation in terms of the degree of consensus that is reached among 
the actors involved in the decision-making process. They explain cross border co-
operation mainly by looking at the distribution of interests and resources.
Le Marquand (Fox & Le Marquand, 1978; Le Marquand, 1977) is generally 
considered to be the first to systematically address the topic of cross border co-
operation in international rivers. In his multiple case study Le Marquand puts down 
some basic ideas of negotiation analysis. ‘Together the hydrological sequence of 
the countries within a basin and the present or potential social-economic demands 
on the river by the basin countries create different patterns of incentives for co-
operation. These patterns of riparian relationships can be usefully discussed in 
terms of common property of resources. The river is the medium by which effects 
of actions taken in one country […] are transported to other basin countries’ (Le 
Marquand, 1977: 7-8). In short: to establish cross border co-operation ‘for each party 
the net satisfaction desired from international agreement must be greater than that 
associated with the national option’ (ibid: 19).
Using these assumptions Le Marquand undertakes a multiple case study of four 
international rivers: the Colorado , the Columbia River and the Skagit River in North 
America and the Rhine in Western Europe. Based on a comparative analysis of these 
four cases he draws conclusions about conditions that favour agreement. The most 
important condition is that all countries involved have something to lose if agreement 
is not reached. Secondly, agreements might be more readily accomplished if the 
chief executives of the countries involved show a commitment to resolve the issues 
at stake. Thirdly, agreement will only arise when a minimum level of certainty about 
the consequences of pursuing certain alternatives is created for decision makers. 
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Finally, global organisations like the United Nations or the Council of Europe can 
provide useful assistance, helping to promote river basin co-operation.
During the 1980s and 1990s several studies were published, using more or less 
the same approach as Le Marquand. Generally, their conclusions are similar to Le 
Marquand’s. Some of these authors give a nuance to his conclusions, for example 
by pointing out the importance of national (internal) politics as an explanation for 
successful cross border co-operation (Vlachos, Webb & Murphy, 1986), by stressing 
that successful cross border co-operation will only come about if the stakeholders 
acknowledge that co-operation is a time-consuming process of small steps (Huisman, 
De Jong & Wieriks, 2000), or by explaining how international organisations (Schiff & 
Winters, 2002) or non-governmental organisations (Turnock, 2001) could encourage 
cross border co-operation.
Saetevik (1988) takes the analysis one step further. She analyses cross border 
co-operation in the Paris Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution from 
Land-Based Sources. This convention was signed by eight North Sea countries and 
the European Community in Paris in 1974 and entered into force in 1978. Saetevik 
measures the extent of cross border co-operation by looking at the outcomes of the 
decision making process regarding the Paris Convention, more specifically the 
decisions regarding regulation of several contaminants. She distinguishes between 
binding decisions, recommendations and non-decisions. Saetevik explains the 
conditions that lead to each type of decision.
A large part of her analysis focuses on the inf luence of the distribution of 
interests and resources among the countries involved in the Paris Convention. She 
concludes that countries that produce less pollution and/or that are strongly affected 
by pollution were the strongest advocates of strict regulation and that the more 
resources a country has available, the better it is capable of infl uencing decision 
making. Important resources were the availability of knowledge, the personal 
qualities of the delegation members and the size of the national administration 
devoted to the topics discussed in the Paris Convention. Saetevik’s main contribution 
to the debate is the acknowledgement that negotiations do not take place in a vacuum. 
She especially analyses the infl uence of institutional constraints. Unanimity was the 
basis of the existing decision making procedures. As a result, the decisions of the 
Paris Convention refl ected the preferences of the least ambitious country.
Dupont (Dupont, 1993a;1993b) pays attention to other aspects of the context 
in which negotiations take place, especially cultural aspects. He analyses cross 
border co-operation within the International Commission for the Protection of the 
Rhine . He investigates how the differences and similarities between the countries 
involved infl uenced negotiations. One set of differences and similarities that he 
investigated is related to the negotiation pattern. He concludes that countries 
increasingly came to regard water pollution as a shared problem that was their 
joint responsibility. As a result they were able to reach an agreement despite the 
great differences in socioeconomic interests. According to Dupont it was also 
important that the countries within the Rhine river basin have a common history, 
close geographical and communication links, and a great similarity in fundamental 
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norms and values. He concludes that this homogeneous cultural background helped 
negotiators conduct negotiations in a more constructive way than would otherwise 
have prevailed, although it was obviously not suffi cient to prevent occasional friction 
and misunderstandings among the parties. Finally, Dupont states that it was easier 
to reach agreement in periods of close proximity in the political orientation of the 
member states. Differences between the countries were relatively large regarding 
fi ve other cultural characteristics: the emotions attached to the river, the level of 
 environmental awareness, the institutional structures, the willingness to abandon 
sovereignty, and the negotiation styles and languages used. According to Dupont this 
slowed negotiations and made it more diffi cult to reach agreement.
Meijerink (2007, 1998) takes a much more descriptive approach to the dependent 
variable than the authors discussed so far. He mainly explains which factors cause 
changes during decision making without making any normative statements about 
the qualities of this decision making process, nor of the products that are its results. 
Meijerink is also the one of few researchers who actually uses the word ‘network’ 
in his analysis.7 He points out some specifi c characteristics of policy networks in 
international river management. First of all, central authority is absent. Secondly, the 
actors involved have different cultural backgrounds, while there may be great (legal) 
differences in policy making between the countries involved. Thirdly, the hydrological 
structure may cause an asymmetric distribution of interests and resources among 
the actors involved in decision making. Finally,  disasters, such as fl oods and extreme 
pollution, are likely to have a great impact on decision making.
Meijerink conducted a case study of confl ict and co-operation in decision making 
about the Scheldt River Basin. The Scheldt is a relatively small international river, 
which rises in France and fl ows through Belgium and the Netherlands to the North 
Sea . Important stakeholders in the Scheldt River Basin are the French, Belgian and 
Dutch national authorities, as well as the authorities of the three Belgian regions 
Wallonia, Flanders and the Brussels Capital. Major water issues in the Scheldt River 
Basin were water quality and estuarine rehabilitation.8 Both problems were most 
strongly felt within the Netherlands, the most downstream country in the river basin. 
In order to put these problems on the international political agenda the Dutch had 
to link both problems to other issues. From the start of negotiations, water quality 
and estuarine rehabilitation were linked to the issue of maritime access to the port of 
Antwerp, a very important issue for the Belgian and Flemish authorities. Later these 
three issues were further linked to the issue of water quality in the river Meuse, the 
other important French-Belgian-Dutch river basin, and the route of the new high-
speed railway between Paris and Amsterdam.
Two major conclusions about cross-border co-operation in water politics can 
be drawn from Meijerink’s case study. First of all, ‘in situations of heterogeneous 
preference intensities across policy domains and in which the decision-making 
rule is unanimity (as has always been the case in the negotiations on the water 
conventions), chances for issue linkages are high. By exploiting differences amongst 
negotiators, win-lose games were transformed into positive sum games […]. It can, 
however, also be learned from this case that the short-term implication of issue 
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linkages is a delay in the negotiations’ (Meijerink, 2007: 29). Secondly, we learn 
from Meijerink’s analysis that ‘transbasin and interstate linkages that redistribute 
the resources among users may increase the number of stakeholders and riparians 
who incur costs, and so may provide an incentive to oppose the agreement. […] The 
linkages which the Dutch had made between the Scheldt and Meuse issues provided 
an incentive for the Walloon region to oppose the agreements proposed’ (Meijerink, 
2006, 29-30). Meijerink (1998: 250-251) also draws some minor conclusions. First of 
all, the presence of different platforms where representatives of the river basin states 
discuss the same or comparable issues is useful. It creates multiple options to keep 
negotiations going. Secondly, some kind of structuring of international relations in 
river basins may encourage the development of international policies. International 
river commissions might have an encouraging effect. Finally, joint research might 
contribute to an agreement on the cognitive aspects of the issues at stake by reducing 
uncertainties.
Conclusions
The works discussed so far give an important insight into factors that may encourage 
cross border co-operation in water politics. The most important factor that explains 
cross border co-operation is the distribution of interests and resources among the 
actors in the river basin. It will be easier to achieve cross border co-operation if all 
actors have got something to gain by co-operation. If this is not the case a solution 
might be found in the redistribution of (fi nancial) resources or in a process of issue 
linkage. Apart from the distribution of interests and resources, the total quantity of 
resources available to the policy network is also important; in particular, the presence 
of suffi cient (joint) knowledge encourages cross border co-operation. Finally, it is 
important to pay attention to the institutional and cultural context in which negoti-
ations take place.
2.3 Analyses based on regime theories
Young (1980) defines regimes as ‘recognised patterns of practice around which 
expectations converge. […] These patterns have both a substantive and a procedural 
component. The substantive component consists of a collection of rights and rules, 
though not necessarily in an organizational framework, while the procedural 
component consists of recognized arrangements for resulting situations requiring 
social or collective choices’. In short: the concept regime refers to the principles, 
norms, rules and procedures that implicitly or explicitly guide interactions between 
actors.9 In a regime approach successful cross border co-operation means the 
establishment of a cross border regime and the solution of the problems for which 
the regime had been installed in the first place. These two criteria are called 
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regime formation and regime effectiveness, respectively (see for example Young & 
Osherenko, 1993).
The fi rst publication to use the regime perspective to analyse cross border co-
operation is a paper by Mingst (1981), who analyses cross border co-operation 
in respect of pollution of the river Rhine . Unfortunately, Mingst is very brief in 
explaining why the regime on pollution of the river Rhine evolved as it did. Apart 
from explicitly rejecting a technocratic, functionalist explanation for regime 
formation, she only points at ‘the political process’ without providing a compre-
hensive alternative explanation for regime formation. Later authors fi lled this gap. 
We discuss two approaches. The fi rst approach is comparable to the one discussed in 
the previous section. It is basically an analysis of negotiations. The second approach 
is more typical of  regime theory, in that it studies the effects of the institutional 
design of a regime.
Negotiations as an explanation
The fi rst author we discuss is Linnerooth (1990), who describes and explains how a 
regime for the river Danube evolved. Linnerooth explains in extenso that sovereign 
states need encouragement to start co-operating. She explains that the necessary 
stimuli are divided unequally among the river states in the Danube river basin. In 
terms of both water quality and water quantity issues, the upstream countries had 
the advantage. Downstream countries only had an advantage in regard to navigation 
issues. The existing asymmetric power relations between the countries in the 
Danube river basin explain why regime formation proceeded only very slowly, in 
an incremental type of muddling through. Linnerooth mentions two possibilities 
by which downstream countries could accelerate regime formation: issue linkage 
and the encouragement of  environmental awareness in the upstream countries. Both 
options are diffi cult to implement and would take some considerable time.
In a later analysis of regime formation in the Danube river basin Linnerooth 
(Linnerooth Bayer & Murcott, 1996) explains why regime formation was accelarated 
in the years after the collapse of communism in 1989. First of all, the disinte-
gration of the Soviet Union had the effect that Austria and Yugoslavia no longer 
blocked expansion of the Soviet dominated regime to other areas than navigation. 
Secondly, a general increase of environmental awareness diminished the relevance 
of the upstream-downstream circumstances and enhanced interest in cross border 
co-operation throughout the river basin. Thirdly, because many of the Eastern 
European countries sought membership of the European Union, cross border co-
operation became a more natural strategy for them. We could say that the existence 
of a complementary regime encouraged regime formation.
List (1990) analyses cross border regime formation in regard to the Baltic Sea . 
According to List a cross border regime had indeed developed regarding pollution 
of the Baltic Sea. This regime had largely been formalised within the 1974 Helsinki 
Convention. Subsequent to this convention, a growing number of principles, 
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norms, rules and procedures had steadily developed, which is the fi rst indication 
of the success of the Baltic Sea regime. The second indication is that most of the 
recommendations of the Helsinki Commission had later been implemented in 
national regulations and that a joint monitoring program had been developed. List 
also briefl y discusses the effects of this successful process of regime formation: ‘a 
fair but sad summary probably would be: there have been some achievements, but 
much more needs to be done. And, what is worse, further steps will probably be more 
diffi cult, requiring profound changes in industrial as well as agricultural production’ 
(List, 1990: 107-108). Finally, the regime had some consequences beyond the issue 
area of Baltic marine environmental protection. The regime set an example of 
international co-operation between states with different social and political systems 
that face common problems.
According to List fi ve factors explain the successful process of regime formation 
in regard to Baltic marine environmental protection. First of all, pollution of the 
Baltic Sea was a common problem for all countries involved. All of them contributed 
to pollution and all of them were harmed by the consequences of this pollution. 
Secondly, free rider behaviour would lead to ecological damage in the free-riding 
country itself and to the loss of prestige within the small and intensively interacting 
group of states. Thirdly, a high density of interactions among oceanographers and 
marine biologists helped lay the epistemic foundations of the regime. Fourthly, 
regime formation was positively inf luenced by experiences from comparable 
processes of regime formation elsewhere. Finally, national policies played a positive 
role in bringing about the regime. An example is the new Ostpolitik of West 
Germany, which resulted in the recognition of the GDR as an independent state, thus 
paving the way to an international treaty signed by all Baltic Sea states, including 
the two German states. List also explicitly dismisses one particular explanation of 
regime formation: there was no  hegemonic power that enforced regime formation.
Dieperink (1997; 2002), who analyses regime formation in regard to pollution 
of the river Rhine , distinguishes six periods in regime formation, each of which 
is characterised by a signifi cant change. They are: the fi rst international contacts 
(pre-1950), international problem fi nding (1950-1963), pollution on the public agenda 
(1963-1972), treaties for the river Rhine (1972-1976), deadlocks in negotiations (1976-
1986), towards ecological revival (1986-1994). The extent of the regime increased in 
all periods distinguished, apart from the period between 1976 and 1986, which was 
characterised by deadlocked negotiations.
In his analysis Dieperink tries to explain which characteristic of the negotiation 
process is responsible for the observed regime changes. His conclusion is that three 
characteristics are necessary conditions for regime formation: the possibilities 
for trade-offs during negotiations, the size of negotiating delegations and regular 
formulation of new ideas and initiatives. All three characteristics greatly ease 
negotiations. In fact, the only period of stagnation in regime formation (1976-1986) 
was characterised by reduced possibilities for trade-offs and a lack of new initiatives. 
Most of the other independent variables turned out not to be necessary conditions 
for regime formation, but nevertheless had an encouraging infl uence. Important 
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factors include the level of symmetry between interests of the countries in the river 
basin, positive involvement of politicians, the level of environmental awareness, the 
‘negotiation qualities’ of the delegations, the availability of technical knowledge, the 
experiences with negotiations on comparable issues and the quality of the river basin 
organisation. Two variables are irrelevant according to Dieperink: informal relations 
between delegations and the existence of a facilitating third party.
Lindemann (2006) has formulated several hypotheses about the determinants 
of water regime formation in cross border settings. He distinguishes power-based, 
interest-based, knowledge-based and context-based hypotheses. The power-based 
hypothesis states that the presence of a downstream hegemon is a necessary 
condition for water regime formation along international rivers. The interest-based 
hypothesis states that it will be easier to establish cross border co-operation when the 
problem at hand is seen as a collective problem by all countries in the river basin. If 
this is not the case the bargaining process might be advanced using strategies like 
side payments or issue linkages. Knowledge-based hypotheses stress the role of the 
diffusion of innovative practices among several river basins as well as the role of 
an  epistemic community that develops a shared understanding of the problem at 
hand. Context-based hypotheses refer to the important role played by national and 
international events that are seemingly unrelated to the issue under consideration in 
determining if and when an international water regime is established
Lindemann tests these hypotheses for regime formation in the Rhine and Elbe 
river basins. He sets power-based hypotheses aside as they cannot explain regime 
formation adequately. In the Rhine river basin, for example, the downstream country, 
the Netherlands, defi nitely did not operate as a hegemon. Interest -based hypotheses 
provide more insight into the formation of the water regime, but only in the Rhine 
river basin. As expected, it was easier to establish cross border co-operation in the 
Rhine river basin for chemical pollution than for chloride pollution, as the costs of 
chemical pollution were more symmetrically distributed among the countries in the 
basin. Regarding chloride pollution the problem was solved by making use of side 
payments. In the Elbe river basin, on the other hand, the upstream Czech Republic 
has engaged in costly international water co-operation without receiving adequate 
fi nancial compensation from Germany. In accordance with the knowledge-based 
hypothesis, the case of the Rhine river basin illustrates the importance of epistemic 
communities that develop a shared understanding of the problem at hand, while 
in the Elbe river the German idea of establishing an International Commission for 
the Protection of the Elbe was based on the experiences within the International 
Commission for the Protection of the Rhine .
Context-based hypotheses provide an important additional explanation of the 
establishment of cross border co-operation in both river basins. The fi rst important 
contextual factor is the European integration process. In the Rhine river basin it 
encouraged cross border co-operation because countries were already tied together 
by a complex, dense web of linkages and because it allowed the Dutch government 
the option of establishing the threat of legal sanctions against upstream polluters. 
On the other hand, Germany was only willing to formalise standards for chemical 
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pollution after a consensus on similar standards had been reached among the EU 
member states. A second contextual factor is the occurrence of  disasters. The Sandoz 
spill of 1986 in particular helped to overcome disparities in upstream-downstream 
conditions in the Rhine river basin and turned the river into an international public 
good. Similarly, the collapse of communism in 1989 provided a unique window of 
opportunity for the development of the Elbe water regime.
The main question posed by Bressers and Kuks (2004) is: which conditions lead to 
regime shifts towards sustainable regional water resource regimes? They conducted 
a quantitative analysis of regime formation in 12 regional water regimes, all of them 
dealing with water quality issues.10 Statistics were used to describe regime changes. 
Bressers and Kuks conclude that most of the 12 regimes changed signifi cantly in 
the research period. All of them became more complex; they came to included more 
water uses and water users. Most regimes also became more integrated; they became 
more coherent in terms of the level of interaction between actors, the number of 
shared resources and the extent to which the interdependencies in the water system 
were refl ected within regulation.
Bressers and Kuks also calculated correlations between regime change and 
sustainability. They conclude that there is only weak support for the expectation 
that an increased complexity contributes to a more sustainable regime. There is 
stronger support for the expectation that an increased integration contributes to a 
more sustainable regime. However, regimes turned out to be most sustainable if they 
became both more complex as well as more integrated.
Finally, Bressers and Kuks analysed correlations between several ‘conditions’ 
and regime change. They conclude that attempts to change regimes into a more 
integrated status will have relatively more success when there is a relatively long, pre-
existing tradition of co-operation in the water management sector, when there is a 
common understanding that the effects of non-integrated water management harm 
sustainability, when there is a notion of possible ‘win-win situations’, when there is 
a credible threat of a dominant actor accumulating power and altering the public 
governance pattern in his interest when no solution is reached, and when there are 
well functioning institutional interfaces (Bressers & Kuks, 2004: 14). They conclude 
that, taken together, these fi ve conditions correlate closely with regime change.11 Of 
the separate conditions the existence of a possible win-win situation and the existence 
of institutional interfaces turned out to be most important.
Conclusions on regime formation and -change
What we learn from the works discussed in this section does not differ much from 
what we learned from the network analyses discussed in the previous section. The 
main difference is that the use of the regime concept offers a better focus on the 
dependent variable. It also improves the analysis when we distinguish between 
the level of co-operation as such and the level of problem solving. Regarding the 
independent variable we see, again, that the recognition that the problem at hand 
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is a joint problem is the most important explanation for successful cross border 
co-operation. An important new insight concerns the fact that the presence of a 
 hegemonic power will probably not have an effect on the establishment of cross 
border co-operation. Another new insight is the relevance of the frequent production 
of new ideas and initiatives. We also fi nd some new relevant aspects in the context 
of the network or regime, namely the institutional interfaces mentioned by Bressers 
and Kuks, the learning processes and co-operation between scientists mentioned by 
both List and Lindemann, and the wider European political context mentioned by 
both Linnerooth and Lindemann.
Institutional design as an explanation
In this section we discuss two authors who stress the importance of the institutional 
design of a regime: Marty (2001) and Skjaerseth (2000). Marty conducted a case 
study of cross border co-operation in fi ve cases: the regulation of the Alpine Rhine 
(Austria, Switzerland), the Rio Grande rectifi cation project (United States, Mexico), 
the Pancheshwar multipurpose project on the Mahakali River (India, Nepal), the 
Colorado River salinity problem (United States, Mexico) and the sanitation problem 
in the Tijuana River Basin (United States, Mexico).
Marty concludes that, as expected, the confi guration of incentives and interests is 
a signifi cant determinant of the regime formation process. If countries are mutually 
affected by the problem, the chances for regime formation are higher. A good example 
is the case of the Rio Grande . Problem pressure did not differ greatly between 
the United States’ and the Mexican side of the river. Accordingly, Americans and 
Mexicans had just about the same incentives to improve river conditions. However, 
agreement on the collective nature of the water issue at hand is not a sufficient 
condition for the establishment of cross border co-operation. The case of the Alpine 
Rhine for example showed that that the Swiss and Austrian governments did agree 
on the collective nature of the fl ooding problem, but nevertheless they could not 
agree easily on the preferred solution. Marty also points at the domestic dimension of 
riparian problems. In general, a dichotomy of incentives and resources between local 
level stakeholders and the political leadership at higher levels of government may 
obstruct cross border co-operation. This happened in the Tijuana case, for example.
Differences in incentives for cross border co-operation might be resolved by 
changing the incentive structure. The best way of doing this would be directly. ‘If 
those who are requested to change their behaviour in a particular direction perceive 
this as infl icting signifi cant welfare costs on them, those who request behavioural 
changes must have strong incentives at hand to effect the desired changes or there 
will probably be no alternative way for them other than to contribute themselves to the 
cost of problem solving if they are really keen on solving the problem’ (Marty, 2001: 
355). This is exactly what happened in both the Tijuana and the Colorado River case. 
In both cases the US government paid for the solution of problems that were caused 
in Mexico. Using political pressure to resolve the problem of an asymmetric incentive 
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structure is a less successful strategy. The only successful example described by Marty 
is the Colorado River case, where the Mexican leadership threatened to seek interna-
tional arbitration in order to arrive at the fi nal solution of the salinity problem.
Apart from the incentive structure, another important factor that sometimes 
hampers cross border co-operation is transaction costs – the costs of the development 
of riparian institutions. According to Marty uncertainty about the behaviour of other 
countries is the most important factor underlying high transaction costs. Marty 
distinguishes several strategies to reduce  transaction costs, such as the strategy of 
internalising benefi ts, third party consultation and realising the commitment of high-
level political authority. This last strategy is important because local level actors do not 
usually have the fi nancial means or the authority to become active internationally.
Marty also investigates regime effectiveness. According to him, riparians can 
signifi cantly increase the effectiveness of river basin institutions by the way they are 
designed.12 First, institutions should be specifi c. After signing the (not very specifi c) 
preliminary agreement of 1872 between Austria and Switzerland in the case of the 
Alpine Rhine , for example, it took 20 years before all the details were settled and 
the fi nal treaty could be signed! Secondly, regimes should be feasible. If resources 
are not adequate to achieve the objectives, more resources must be made available 
or the objectives must be amended so they fall in line with the resources available. 
Thirdly, institutions should be fl exible. In practice this means that regulations should 
include general objectives, but they should not stipulate how these objectives must 
be achieved. Fourthly, the success of an institutional arrangement is signifi cantly 
determined by the quality of the actors charged with executing the substantive 
provisions of the arrangement.
Marty fi nishes his analysis by stressing the importance of three contextual factors. 
First of all, in all cases a sudden rise in problem pressure forced a breakthrough in the 
problem-solving process. Secondly, using existing institutions frequently improves 
the resolution of new problems. Thirdly, the involvement of a few fi rmly committed 
individuals helps to bring the development of institutions to a successful close.
Like Marty, Skjaerseth (2000) explicitly uses institutional explanations for 
cross border co-operation, in this case co-operation regarding pollution of the 
North Sea . Cross border co-operation is understood by Skjaerseth to consist of two 
phases: development of international commitments and domestic implementation. 
Development of international commitments is considered to be more successful 
when international commitments have more stringent goals, cover a wider range 
of issues and are more specifi c. Domestic implementation is considered to be more 
successful when the contents of international commitments have been explicitly 
included in domestic policy goals and when these goals have actually been attained. 
Using these criteria, cross border co-operation regarding the North Sea can be rated 
as relatively successful. Especially since the establishment of an annual International 
North Sea Conference in 1984, the commitments of the North Sea regime have 
grown in stringency, have become more specifi c and nowadays affect a wide range 
of sectors. Domestic implementation is investigated by Skjaerseth in three countries: 
Norway, the Netherlands and the UK. The Netherlands have generally adopted 
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domestic goals and plans that are more ambitious than those required interna-
tionally, in Norway they are in line with international obligations and in the UK 
goals and plans have been in line with international targets in some fi elds and have 
been less ambitious in others. Even though Norway’s ambitions were more modest 
than those of the Netherlands, Norway scores higher on goal attainment. Norway 
shows improvements for all pollutants (and even overachievement for some). The 
Netherlands show improvements for some pollutants, but less change than required 
for others. The UK, fi nally, achieved less in comparison to the Netherlands.
Skjaerseth uses two models to explain why the North Sea regime developed 
as it did. The fi rst is called the rational actor model. The core idea in this model 
is that regime development could be explained by examining the interests of the 
national states in terms of the pollution they cause and the pollution damage with 
which they are confronted. The rational actor model is not able to explain the major 
breakthroughs that were achieved in the 1987 International North Sea Conference 
as the problem-related interests of the states concerned did not really change. 
Skjaerseth also dismisses the infl uence of domestic demand for pollution protection. 
The green wave in Western societies occurred mainly after the 1987 breakthroughs. 
The rational actor model is not very strong in explaining domestic implementation 
either. Governments depend on the co-operation of three actor groups: agriculture, 
industry and municipalities. The incentives for implementation did not differ 
strongly between the actor groups industry and agriculture. Nevertheless, the level 
of implementation turned out to be much higher for industry than for agriculture.
Skjaerseth offers an alternative model for the explanation of cross border co-
operation. This second one is called the institutional model. Institutions are politically 
or legally binding sets of explicit procedures and rules that regulate the behaviour of 
actors. Skjaerseth distinguishes international and domestic institutions. He explains 
that international institutions encouraged the development of a North Sea regime in 
three ways. First, international institutions created common norms and values as a 
result of the existence of formal forums, very frequent meetings and the existence of 
permanent administrative and scientifi c bodies. Secondly, international institutions 
encouraged the aggregation and integration of the interests of the countries involved. 
They created clarity about the objectives of the countries involved and they installed 
majority-vote decision-making procedures that prevented stalemates. Finally, interna-
tional institutions infl uenced the implementation behaviour of states. Commitments 
were legally binding, clear and transparent, and provided for an enforcement 
system.
Domestic institutions infl uenced domestic implementation. First, horizontal and 
vertical fragmentation within government tends to increase discrepancies between 
national goals and the adoption of measures needed to implement them. According 
to Skjaerseth the high level of fragmentation in the Netherlands explains why this 
country scored relatively poorly on the criterion of goal attainment. Secondly, the 
available policy tools are important, especially national preferences for voluntary 
agreements or command and control policy tools. The Dutch preference for voluntary 
agreements offers a good explanation of the mismatch between Dutch goals and 
actual results.
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Skjaerseth also briefl y refl ects on the way institutions are created that encourage 
cross-border co-operation. He especially pays attention to the origin of successful 
institutions at the international level. Two explanations are offered. The fi rst focuses 
on the existence of two twin-institutions: the International North Sea Conference 
and the Oslo and Paris Commissions, which provided mutually complementary 
functions in the same issue area. The second explanation focuses on the history 
of regime formation. Skjaerseth observes that early successes in regime formation 
regarding a few substances later resulted in agreement on phasing out discharges of 
all anthropogenic hazardous substances within 25 years.
Conclusions on institutional design
The two authors discussed in this section give valuable additional insights into the 
factors that infl uence cross border co-operation, especially the importance of the 
institutional context within which co-operation evolves. Marty mainly focuses on 
the design of international agreements within which regime formation results. 
According to Marty a regime should be specifi c, feasible and fl exible. Moreover, the 
quality of the actors charged with executing the regime is of importance. According 
to Skjaerseth international regimes should create common norms and values and 
encourage the aggregation and integration of the interests of the countries involved. 
Although formulated on a higher level of abstraction, Skjaerseth’s conclusions do 
not contradict Marty’s. Flexibility, for example, is a condition for the integration of 
interests, while the existence of a central actor might encourage common norms and 
values. Moreover, both authors stress that institutions develop slowly and can only be 
understood against their historical background. Skjaerseth stresses the importance 
of domestic implementation. Although Marty does state that characteristics of 
national policy making are important in explaining regime ineffectiveness, domestic 
implementation is no issue in his analysis of cross border co-operation. A difference 
between the two authors is the level of attention they devote to more traditional 
explanations of cross border co-operation. According to Marty the distribution of 
interests and resources can still be a vital explanation of cross border co-operation, 
while Skjaerseth states that such explanations fail to provide explanations. In our 
opinion Skjaerseth dismisses traditional variables such as interests, resources and 
interdependencies too readily.
Analyses based on cognitive and discursive theories
Recently we have been able to witness the rise of a new approach in the literature 
on cross border co-operation in water politics. In this new approach the focus shifts 
from the organisational dimension of policy making to the contents dimension. 
Cognitive and discursive approaches stress that the extent of co-operation, as well 
as the direction in which it evolves, is strongly infl uenced by the concepts that actors 
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use to give meaning to the problems with which they are confronted. Cognitive and 
discursive analysts want to fi nd out which beliefs are held by the policy making 
actors, how these beliefs come about and how these beliefs infl uence cross border 
policy making.13 In contrast to network and regime theories, cognitive and discursive 
theories have not yet developed into a coherent theoretical framework. Therefore, the 
discussion in this section are a little more fragmented than the discussion in the 
previous sections.
The work by Haas (1990) is the earliest example of the use of a discursive 
approach to the explanation of cross border co-operation in water politics. Haas 
analyses the extent to which co-operation regarding environmental pollution of the 
Mediterranean Sea can be explained using two traditional stances within the study 
of international relations: (neo-) realism and historical materialism. Both approaches 
stress the confl icting nature of international relations and in both approaches the 
distribution of power among the actors involved is the most important factor that 
explains the extent to which and the way in which cross border co-operation evolves. 
Haas rejects such explanations of cross border co-operation in the Mediterranean 
Sea. He points to the fact that the so-called MedPlan hardly refl ected the interests 
of France, the dominant country in the region, nor did it strengthen the position of 
France and the other European countries in the region. Furthermore, the Mediter-
ranean countries were willing to transfer much more of their national authority than 
the two traditional approaches would hypothesise.
According to Haas the rise of a transnational alliance of scientists offers a better 
explanation for cross border co-operation in the Mediterranean Sea. ‘Members 
of this community staffed UNEP14 and served in the administration of several 
Mediterranean countries. They shared common beliefs about causes of pollution 
which informed their policy advice and action in the issue area. They also shared 
common political objectives in reorganizing and creating new governmental and 
intergovernmental institutions that would be responsible for more comprehensive 
forms of environmental protection. […] They all considered themselves ecologists. 
They all believed in the need to protect the human environment. They believed that 
the Mediterranean was endangered from a number of different sources of pollution’ 
(Haas, 1990: 217). Domestically, the  epistemic community penetrated policy making 
as well. Its members served on delegations to MedPlan meetings and staffed environ-
mental ministries. Finally, the fact that the epistemic community took ecology 
as their main stance is important. Ecology is a broad discipline, so it was able to 
incorporate a variety of concerns. The broad nature of ecology also prevented the 
prevalence of one particular interpretation of pollution. Other important features of 
the Mediterranean negotiations were also important, such as a technically capable 
secretariat and belief in the data it submitted.
A second author to use a cognitive approach to arrive at an understanding of cross 
border co-operation in water politics is Meijerink (2007). We have already discussed 
his network analysis of cross border co-operation in the Scheldt River Basin in 
section 2. Here we discuss his analysis using the so-called Advocacy Coalition 
Framework.15 According to this perspective antagonistic advocacy coalitions compete 
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in specifi c political fi elds and attempt to infl uence political decisions according to 
their divergent conceptions of an issue. Advocacy coalition s are composed of persons 
in various positions that share a specifi c belief system. Such belief systems consist of 
policy core beliefs and secondary beliefs. Policy core beliefs are sets of fundamental 
values, causative hypotheses and problem perceptions. Learning processes within 
and across advocacy coalitions may account for (incremental) policy change.
According to Meijerink (2007) three advocacy coalitions existed in the Scheldt 
River Basin. The Antwerp or pro-development coalition consists inter alia of offi cials 
of the port of Antwerp, the City of Antwerp local authority and the Flemish Ministry 
of Infrastructure and Sea Affairs. The core policy belief of this coalition concerned 
maritime access to the port of Antwerp and the idea that the Dutch are unwilling 
to improve this maritime access. The environmentalist coalition is a cross-border 
coalition consisting of representatives of a large number of environmental NGOs, 
regional action groups, researchers in several research institutes and representatives 
of various Dutch governmental organisations. The core policy belief of this coalition 
was that the Scheldt estuary is a unique ecosystem, which needs to be preserved and 
which should be managed collectively. The third advocacy coalition is a coalition 
of farmers, farmers’ organisations and individual residents in the Dutch province 
of Zeeland. This advocacy coalition mainly opposed the idea of compensating for 
nature losses by returning to the sea land which has been reclaimed from the Scheldt 
estuary in previous centuries. This idea was a major part of the fi nal agreement on 
the Scheldt River (see section 2).
Meijerink’s analysis using the Advocacy Coalition Framework explains why 
the Scheldt estuary was increasingly perceived as a shared water system. ‘The 
environmentalist coalition was a cross-border coalition which was strongly tied to an 
epistemic community of ecologists. This coalition tried to shape a policy image of the 
Scheldt estuary as a unique ecosystem, which needs to be preserved. Only after the 
Dutch decision to unlink the bilateral and multilateral Scheldt issues, after which the 
level of confl ict was reduced, did learning across the pro-development and environ-
mentalist coalition start to develop, and the Antwerp coalition incorporated some 
elements of the environmentalist coalitions in its belief system. This cross-coalition 
learning may account for the changed strategies and techniques for dredging and 
dumping sediments, the development of plans for compensating for nature losses 
caused by the dredging works, and partly for the development of water quality 
policies in the Flemish region’ (Meijerink, 2007: 30-31).
Recently, the discursive approach has taken off thanks to the work of Blatter 
(2001), who investigates cross border co-operation around Lake Constance 16, which 
is located in the Upper Rhine and is bordered by Germany, Austria and Switzerland. 
In his case study Blatter focuses on the regulation of motorboats on the Lake. This 
cross border co-operation would appear to be a success. With the establishment of 
emission standards for boats, an incentive now exists for the production of cleaner, 
quieter motors for boats.
Blatter starts his analysis of the degree of success of cross border co-operation 
around Lake Constance with the following observation: ‘Transboundary co-operation 
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at Lake Constance is not well explained by the existence of “problematic situations” in 
which actors attempt to avoid negative externalities and capture positive externalities’ 
(Blatter, 2001: 90). Blatter explains that the damage caused by motor boats arises 
mostly through the landing docks and the transport of people and boats to the 
lake. Therefore, the damage can readily be assigned to a specifi c jurisdiction. Thus, 
the distribution of interests and objectives is not a suffi cient explanation for the 
successful arrival of cross border co-operation around Lake Constance.
Instead, Blatter argues that this problem, being put forward by an international 
cross border coalition of environmental protectionists, offered the existing political 
cross border institutions a fi eld of activity with high symbolic value which these 
institutions could use to emphasise the importance of their existence. Secondly, 
Blatter draws the importance of integration discourses to our attention. In periods 
when the discourse is encouraging cross border co-operation, such as the period 
preceding the signature of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, it is easier to take major 
steps in the establishment of cross border co-operation. Finally, the then dominating 
discourse in western politics explains why so much attention was devoted to pleasure 
boating although pleasure boats are only responsible for approximately half of the 
pollution caused by boats in Lake Constance . As the owners of the motor boats 
were predominantly wealthy individuals, restricting boating fi tted into a politics of 
redistribution, which the favoured working classes over the more affl uent.
The work of Blatter also holds an important warning. He explains that the 
establishment of cross border co-operation, more specifi cally cross border communi-
cation, does not always lead to swift policy making. Lake Constance had two advocacy 
coalitions in the 1970s, which opposed each other intensely. The environmentalist 
coalition believed that a signifi cant presence of boats on Lake Constance represented 
a danger to the natural and cultural heritage of the area. The counter-coalition, on 
the other hand, dismissed the calculated chemical pollution of the lake as a statistical 
artifi ce. The stalemate was only tackled after the involvement of the Swiss, German 
and Austrian governments, which were able to negotiate an agreement.
Conclusions
The works of Haas, Meijerink and Blatter give us some additional insights into factors 
that may encourage cross border co-operation in water politics. First of all, the three 
authors stress the importance of cross border agreement on the main characteristics 
of the problem and on the available solutions. Secondly, it is important that all actors 
involved perceive the cross border problem as a shared problem. Thirdly, if a general 
discourse exists that either encourages the problem’s resolution or encourages 
stimulates cross border co-operation, cross border co-operation will be more easily 
established. Finally, cross border co-operation is more easily achieved when there is 
a group of professionals with a shared vision of the problem area. In some situations 
the existence of a cross border discourse is more likely to obstruct than to encourage 
cross border co-operation. This happens when a stalemate between two cross border 
‘advocacy coalitions’ occurs.
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2.4 Comparing the approaches
In this chapter we have discussed several authors who have investigated cross border 
co-operation in water politics. We fi nd wide differences between the approaches used 
and conclusions drawn by these authors. Throughout this chapter we have used three 
concepts to explain what these studies are about: research units (the cases studied), 
dependent variable (the operationalisation of successful cross border co-operation) 
and independent variable (the factors that inf luence cross border co-operation). 
Tables 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3 summarise these aspects. We have sometimes rephrased the 
terminology used by the authors to make the survey consistent. In this section we 
explain these three tables in greater detail.
Research units
The researchers investigate different types of cases. We can distinguish authors who 
investigated sea co-operation, authors who investigate river basin co-operation and 
authors who investigated regional co-operation. We can also distinguish between 
different types of water related issues, such as water quality issues, f looding or 
navigation.
It is not hard to imagine that other factors will play a role during cross border 
co-operation between national states than during co-operation between regions. 
Similarly, in water quality issues other factors will inf luence cross border co-
operation than in fl ooding or navigation issues. Nevertheless, so far the debate seems 
to have been biased towards cross border co-operation between nation states and 
cross border co-operation on water quality issues. None of the authors takes issue 
with these differences.
Dependent variables
When we compare the approach that the authors take to the measurement of the 
dependent variable we can distinguish two major approaches: a descriptive approach 
and a normative one. The descriptive approach only describes the changes that 
occur during processes of negotiation and regime formation, without making a 
normative statement about these negotiations and their outcomes. Not surprisingly, 
this approach dominates the discursive and cognitive analyses. Furthermore, we also 
fi nd this approach in the work of Dieperink (1997).
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Table 2.1 Overview of selected researchers
Waters included Spatial scope Water related issues




Whole river basin Water quality,
Flooding
Saetevik North Sea Sea Water quality
Dupont Rhine River Whole river basin Water quality
Meijerink Scheldt River Whole river basin, 






Dieperink Rhine River Whole river basin Water quality
Linnerooth Danube River Whole river basin Water quality,
Flooding,
Navigation
List Baltic Sea Sea Water quality
Lindemann Rhine River
Elbe River





Regional section of 
river basin
Water quality












Skjaerseth North Sea Sea Water quality
Haas Mediterranean Sea Sea Water quality
Blatter Lake Constance Regional section of 
river basin
Damage by boating
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Table 2.2 Overview of operationalisation of the dependent variable
Descriptive 
approaches Normative approaches
Co-operation  formation  Co-operation effectiveness
Le Marquand Agreement among actors
Saetevik Agreement among actors,




Dupont Agreement among actors
Meijerink Negotiations
Dieperink Establisment of 
a set of rules
Linnerooth Establisment of a set of 
rules
List Establisment of a set of 
rules
Implementation of rules,
State of the environment 
(related to objectives),
Effects on other co-
operation processes




Establishment of a rules 
that cover many water 
uses and water users,
Establishment of a 
coherent set of rules
Degradation of water 
resources,
Protection of the 
ecological functions of 
water resources
Marty Establisment of a set of 
rules
State of the environment 
(related to objectives)
Skjaerseth Establisment of a set of 
rules
Implementation of rules,
State of the environment 
(related to objectives)
Haas Establishment 
of a set of rules
Blatter Establishment 









Table 2.3 Overview of independent variables
Actors/resources Rules of the game Discourses Other initiatives




Saetevik Distribution of interests and resources,
Availability of knowledge,
Quality of delegations
Majority voting (in stead of 
unanimity)




Comparable emotions attached to 
river,
Level of  environmental awareness
Meijerink Distribution of interests and resources,




Perception/framing of (joint) 
problems,




Dieperink Issue linkage (necessary condition),
Quality of delegations (necessary 
condition),
Distribution of interests and resources,
Involvement of politicians,
Availability of knowledge,
Experiences during other negotiations,
Quality of international secretariat
Production of new ideas (necessary 
condition),
Level of environmental awareness
Linnerooth Distribution of interests and resources,
Issue linkage 
Level of environmental awareness Complementary 
instituations (European 
Union)
List Distribution of interests and resources,
National policies












































Lindemann Distribution of interests and resources Existence of an epistemic community 
(contacts between scientists),
Perception/framing of (joint) 







Issue linkage and redistribution of 
resources
Existing initiatives
Marty Distribution of interests and resources 
between countries,
Distribution of interests and resources 
within countries,
Issue linkage , redistribution of resources 
and internalization of beneÞ ts,




Quality of international secretariat
Bindingness, clarity and 
transparency of international 
commitments,
Feasibility of international 
commitments,
Flexibility of procedures for 
decision making
Perception/framing of (joint) 
problems, (esp after disasters)
Existing initiatives
Skjaerseth Quality of international secretariat Existence of formal fora and 
frequent meetings,
Procedures that stimulate clarity 
on objectives,
Majority voting (in stead of 
unanimity),
Bindingness, clarity and 
transparency of international 
commitments,
Fragmentation within national 
governments,
National preference for command 




Haas Existence of an epistemic community
Blatter Perception/framing of (joint) 
problems,




The other authors do want to make a statement about the quality of cross border 
co-operation. Among them we find two main sets of indicators which strongly 
resemble what we called ‘co-operation  formation’ and ‘co-operation  effectiveness’ in 
the previous chapter.17 Regarding co-operation formation, network theorists tend to 
stress the establishment of agreement as the main success criterion, while regime 
theorists focus on the rules and procedures in which those agreements result. 
Regarding co-operation formation, most authors focus on problem solving as such, 
but List (1990) and Skjaerseth (2000) show that it may be more sensible to focus 
on the level of implementation of the decisions that were taken during co-operation 
formation.
From the use of these indicators, it becomes clear that up till now the debate 
seems to overlook the fact that not all co-operation necessarily aims at joint policy 
making. In fact, the only publication we found that is not about joint policy making 
is a rather descriptive paper by Darakas (2002) on cross border co-operation on the 
Nestos River between researchers from a Greek and a Bulgarian university.
Independent variables
Our main focus has been to explain the conditions under which successful cross 
border co-operation arises. Traditionally the focus has been on negotiations as 
explanatory factors for successful cross border co-operation. Most authors focus on 
the negotiations that constitute the process of co-operation. The main conclusion 
is that cross border co-operation is more easily established when the distribution 
of interests and resources is such that all countries have something to gain in the 
establishment of cross border co-operation. When this is not the case, a solution 
might be found in issue linkage or in the redistribution of resources. Meijerink 
(2007) justly warns us that issue linkage might slow down the process of co-operation 
formation. Another condition that could help to overcome an adverse distribution of 
interests and resources is the existence of a hegemonic actor. However, all authors 
who investigate it dismiss the effectiveness of this condition (Haas, 1990; List, 1990; 
Lindemann, 2006).
The analysis of negotiations also provides some insight into other factors that 
stimulate successful cross border co-operation. Cross border co-operation is more 
easily established when suffi cient knowledge is available, when the quality of the 
delegations and of the international secretariat is high, and when particular actors are 
involved, most notably politicians. There is some disagreement about the involvement 
of third parties that facilitate the process of cross border co-operation. Le Marquand 
(1977), Marty (2001) and Meijerink (1998) claim that third-party assistance will 
positively infl uence the establishment of cross border co-operation, while List (1990) 
and Dieperink (2002) claim that it will not.
The distribution of interests and resources does not always explain the 
establishment of successful cross border co-operation. Skjaerseth (2000) explains 
that a regime was established in the North Sea without any changes in the distri-
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bution of interests and resources, while Blatter (2001) observes that in the Lake 
Constance case, cross border co-operation evolved around an issue that could easily 
have been dealt with at a national level. In such cases other approaches than the 
analysis of negotiations might explain successful cross border co-operation.
One such approach pays attention to the rules of the game. Cross border co-
operation is more easily established when procedures for decision making encourage 
clarity about the objectives of the actors involved, when they are fl exible enough to 
cope with changing circumstances, and when they are based on majority voting. 
Later on, the implementation of cross border regulation will be more successful 
when these commitments are binding, clear, transparent and feasible.
Another approach focuses on discursive and cognitive processes. Cross border 
co-operation is more easily established when the problem at hand is framed as a joint 
problem, when the problem and/or its solution are perceived in similar terms by all 
actors, when an  epistemic community of professionals exists, and when a general 
discourse exists that either encourages solving the problem at hand or encourages 
cross border co-operation in general. It is not clear to what extent higher levels of 
 environmental awareness explain cross border co-operation. According to Skjaerseth 
(2000) it does not, while according to Dieperink (1997) and Linnerooth (1990) it 
does.
All independent variables discussed so far focus on the cross border level itself. 
Some authors stress the infl uence of national policy making and politics. List (1990), 
for example, explains how the West German Ostpolitik paved the way for cross 
border co-operation in the Baltic Sea . Two authors have actually elaborated this type 
of analysis. Marty (2001) analyses the effects of national negotiations, concluding 
that the absence of involvement of national authorities may seriously hamper the 
establishment of cross border co-operation at a regional level. Skjaerseth (2000) 
analyses the effects of national institutions, explaining that a high level of integration 
within national governments as well as a national preference for command and 
control policy tools will positively inf luence the implementation of cross border 
regulation.
Yet another way of analysing cross border co-operation has been used by Dupont 
(1993b), who shows that we might understand cross border co-operation better if we 
look at the cultural differences among the countries in the river basin. Cross border 
co-operation is more easily established when these differences are small. In our view, 
this way of analysing can be broadened, e.g. by looking at differences and similarities 
between national legal frameworks.
Finally, several authors explain the effect of other initiatives for cross border 
co-operation. Cross border co-operation is more easily established when the actors 
involved can build on previous work done within the same regime, when comparable 
regimes exist within the same river basin, and when actors can learn from 
experiences in other river basins. Particularly in the Western European context, the 
process of European integration seems to provide a great stimulus to cross border 
co-operation on river basins.
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Although some of the issues mentioned may play a role in cross border co-
operation in general, some seem to be specifi c to cross border co-operation on river 
management.18 First, the relation between upstream and downstream countries 
strongly infl uences the distribution of interests and resources among the countries 
in the river basin. In general, downstream countries seem to have more interest 
in co-operation than upstream countries when water quality or fl ooding issues are 
at stake, but upstream countries seem to have more interest in co-operation when 
navigation issues are involved. Secondly, river management is traditionally a rather 
technical area of policy. As a result, both the amount of knowledge that is available 
and the existence of an epistemic community that constructs this knowledge will 
probably play a greater role in encouraging cross border co-operation than might be 
the case in other policy fi elds.
2.5 Discussion
This chapter has surveyed authors who have investigated issues of cross border co-
operation on river politics. We have seen that there is a great deal of knowledge about 
the determinants of successful cross border co-operation; one may even wonder why 
we believe that additional research is necessary.
A first reason to add to this impressive amount of literature concerns case 
selection. Hitherto, the investigations have been biased towards cross border co-
operation between nation states, water quality problems and co-operation aimed at 
joint policy making. In our study we focus on regional cross border co-operation and 
we aim at a balanced case selection in terms of the types of water-related problems 
and the phases in our model for the development of cross border co-operation.
A second reason concerns the operationalisation of the dependent variable. In 
the previous chapter we explained some of the problems related to the co-operation 
 formation criterion. Our main consideration was that cross border co-operation 
does not always focus on joint policy making. We explained that other types of co-
operation also exist and, moreover, that the existence of such types of co-operation 
is often a pre-requisite for the establishment of joint policy making. We elaborated 
these ideas in a model for the development of cross border co-operation (chapter 1). In 
our view, we provide for a more precise operationalisation of the dependent variable.
A fi nal reason concerns our frame of analysis. When we compare all approaches to 
analysing the independent variable we get a three-by-three matrix with nine possible 
approaches (see table 2.4). Strikingly, a large majority of the works discussed are 
located in one cell of the matrix. Some cells are still empty. For example, none of the 
researchers discussed analyses the effect of national discourses on cross border co-
operation. We believe that such an analysis might provide additional value. Therefore, 
the frame of analysis that we described in the previous chapter tries to do justice 
to all nine cells of the matrix. This refl ects a more comprehensive idea of possible 
explanatory variables, focussing on the different dimensions of actors, interest and 
coalitions, resources, rules of the game, and discourse.
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Table 2.4 Overview of approaches towards the independent variable
























1 The author wishes to thank Sander Meijerink for his comments on a previous version of this 
chapter.
2 We found two literature reviews. The one by Bernauer (2002) only compares three works, while 
that by Dieperink (1997) is in Dutch, fails to provide a theoretical refl ection. Some of the literature 
we encountered did not explain cross border co-operation, but only gave descriptions. Some of the 
literature was too technical, obsolete, brief or superfi cial for our purposes.
3 Of course the distinction between water dispute resolution literature and water co-operation 
literature is sometimes arbitrary. The existence of co-operation does not automatically mean the 
absence of confl ict, for example. Nevertheless, the terminologies used as well as the kind of cases 
studied are generally good indicators of the fi eld of thought to which a particular work belongs.
4 When this debate started most authors were convinced that water, especially river water, would 
become a major cause of armed conf lict in the near future, for example Bullock and Darwish 
(1993), Gleick (1993) or Homer-Dixon (1994). Recently, some authors have put forward arguments 
against the plausibility of future water wars, e.g.: Wolf (1998) or Kalpakian (2004). Wolf (1998: 
261) concludes that war over water is ‘neither strategically rational, hydrographically effective, nor 
economically viable’.
5 Interesting works regarding this issue are Turton and Ashton (2003), who analyse dispute resolution 
in the Okavango river basin; Blatter and Ingram (2001), who use discursive approaches to analyse 
co-operation in several river basins throughout the world; Dinar and Dinar (2000), who edited a 
special issue on international negotiation on cross border co-operation in developing countries; 
Beach (2000) who gives a theoretical overview as well as several case studies of dispute resolution; 
Biswas (1997), who edited a special issue on management of international waters; Wolf (1997), who 
undertakes a quantitative analysis of conditions that contribute to confl ict resolution; Rangeley et 
al. (1994), who give an overview of river basin organisation in sub-Saharan Africa; and Lowi (1993), 
who analyses disputes in the Jordan river basin.
6 Some of the authors that we discuss do pay some attention to cross border co-operation in non-
Western settings, namely Marty (2001) and Schiff and Winters (2002).
7 For more information on network theories see Marsh and Rhodes (1992). For an application of 
network theories on water politics see Bressers, O’Toole et al. (1995).
8 Estuarine rehabilitation refers to the negative impacts of human activities on the geomorphologic 
processes in the estuary.
9 For more information on regime theories see Young (1999), Kahler et al. (1995) or Keohane and Nye 
(1989).
10 Not all these are cross border regimes. Nevertheless, the conclusions of Bressers and Kuks on 
regime formation in water politics are very interesting for our scope.
11 Correlations between all the conditions taken together and the different variables related to the 
concept regime change range from tau .469 (p =.005) to as high as tau .749 (p =.000) (Bressers and 
Kuks, 2004: 60).
12 Marty also extensively analyses the conditions under which regimes arise that are specifi c, feasible, 
fl exible, open, and provide for effective organisations. Unfortunately, we do not have suffi cient space 
here to go into all details of Marty’s analysis. For more information we refer to the original work by 
Marty (2001).
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13 For an application of narrative analysis on water politics see Dicke (2001).
14 United Nations Environment Programme. UNEP was a strong advocate of international 
environmental policy making regarding pollution of the Mediterranean Sea.
15 For more information on the Advocacy Coalition Framework see Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993) 
and Sabatier (1998).
16 Lake Constance is known in German as the Bodensee. This section is based on Blatter (2001). See 
Blatter (2004) for more information on cross border co-operation on Lake Constance.
17 Note the analogy with the concepts regime formation and regime effectiveness.
18 We did not search extensively for literature about cross border co-operation in other policy fi elds. 
However, during our search for literature on cross border co-operation in river management we 
did fi nd some examples. Church and Reid (1996) analyse cross border co-operation in economic 
politics in the Channel; De Jong (1999) describes the problems caused by social-cognitive 
differences between Dutch and German nature politics; Post and Stal (2001) analyse cross border 
co-operation between the Netherlands and Belgium regarding urgent medical assistance; Beerkens 
(2002) analyses cross border co-operation in higher education politics; Gallagher (2003) analyses 
cross border co-operation between English and French police offi cials; Macrory and Turner (2003) 
analyse cross border co-operation in environmental politics in Europe; Van Oudenhoven en Van der 
Zee (2002) analyse cross border co-operation between companies; and fi nally, some authors analyse 
general cross border co-operation in particular regions, such as the Upper Adriatic (Bufon, 2003), 
the German-Polish border area (Grix & Knowles, 2003) or the Baltic Sea Region (Scott, 2003).
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